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Notes to chapter 1 
 
1 Ch. Harvey, J. Hintikka, “Modalization and Modalities”, in Th. M. Seebohm, D. Follesdal, J. N. 
Mohanty (eds.), Phenomenology and the Formal Sciences, Dordrecht/Boston/London, Kluwer 
1991, pp.59-77. 
2 See  E. Husserl, Experience and Judgment,  Northwestern University Press,  Evanston 1973, in 
part.  §7; hereafter EJ. 
3 EJ, 91. 
4 EJ, 272. 
5 Ch. Harvey, J. Hintikka, “Modalization and Modalities”,  cit., p.64. 
6 Ch. Harvey, J. Hintikka, “Modalization and Modalities”, cit., p.75. 
7 See J. Derrida, Speech and Phenomena: Introduction to the Problem of Signs in Husserl’s 
Phenomenology,  Northwestern University Press, Evanston 1973; in part. see the chapter  “Form 
and Meaning: A Note on the Phenomenology of Language” in the same volume. 
8 L. Landgrebe, ‘Unmittelbarkeit der Erfahrung’, in L. Landgrebe (ed.), Edmund Husserl. 1859-
1959, Martinus Nijhoff, La Haye 1959, p.253. 
9 L. Landgrebe, cit., p.257. 
10 Ch.Harvey, J.Hintikka, “Modalization and Modalities”, cit., p.76. 
11 Ch. Harvey, J.Hintikka, “Modalization and Modalities”, cit., p.76. 
12 P. Simons, ‘Meaning and Language’, in B. Smith and D. W. Smith (eds.) The Cambridge 
Companion to Husserl, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1995, p.132 . 
13 EJ, 204. 
14 EJ, 204. 
15 EJ, 122. 
16 EJ, 122. 
17A. Schuetz, “Type and Eidos in Husserl’s Late Philosophy”, in Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research, vol. XX, 2, 1959, p.148. 
18 See A. Schuetz, “Type and Eidos in Husserl’s Late Philosophy”,  cit., p.150. 
19 E. Husserl, Formal and Transcendental Logic, Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague 1969, p.320; 
hereafter FLT. 
20 FLT, 320.   
21See § 5 of E. Husserl , Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological 
Philosophy: Studies in the Phenomenology of Constitution, second book, Kluwer, Dordrecht 1989; 
herafter IPPII. 
22 J. N. Mohanty, “Intentionality and Possible World: Husserl and Hintikka”, in H. Dreyfus (ed.), 
Husserl: Intentionality and Cognitive Science, MIT Press, Cambridge 1982, p.236. 
23 J. Hintikka , “Semantics for Propositional Attitudes”, in Davis, Hockney, Wilson (eds.), 
Philosophical Logic, Reidel Dordrecht 1969, p.24. 
24 R. Cobb-Stevens, Husserl and Analytic Philosophy , Kluwer,  Dordrecht 1990, pp.1-2. 
25 Th. M. Seebohm,  “Possible ‘Worlds’: Remarks about a Controversy”, in F.M. Kirkland, D.P. 
Chattopadhyaya (eds.), Phenomenology: East and West. Essays in Honor of J. N. Mohanty, 
Kluwer, Dordrecht 1993, p.141. 
26 D. Lohmar,  Erfahrung und kategoriales Denken. Hume, Kant und Husserl ueber 
vorpraedikative Erfahrung und praedikative Erkenntnis, Dordrecht,  Kluwer 1998. 
27 D. Lohmar, Erfahrung und kategoriales Denken. Hume, Kant und Husserl ueber 
vorpraedikative Erfahrung und praedikative Erkenntnis, cit., p.252.   
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32 D. Lohmar, Erfahrung und kategoriales Denken. Hume, Kant und Husserl ueber 
vorpraedikative Erfahrung und praedikative Erkenntnis,  cit, p. 253. 
33 EJ, 203. 
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36 EJ, 239. 
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38 J. N. Mohanty, “Husserl on ‘possibility’”, Husserl Studies, 1, 1984. 
39 IPPII, 275. 
40 Cfr. J. N., Mohanty, “Husserl on ‘possibility’”, cit., p.26. 
41 IPPI, 205. 
42 See M. Heidegger, Logik als die Frage nach dem Wesen der Sprache, in Gesamtausgabe, Bd. 
38, Frankfurt a. Main 1998, p.79. 
43 Cfr. E. Husserl, Die Krisis der europaeischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale 
Phaenomenologie. Ergaenzungsband. Texte aus dem Nachlass 1934-1937, Kluwer, The Hague 
1992,  pp.425-426. 
44 E. Husserl, The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology, Northwestern 
University Press, Evanston 1970, pp.142-143. 
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Notes to chapter 2 
 
1 E. Husserl, Thing and Space: Lectures of 1907, Kluwer, Dordrecht 1997, p.2; hereafter TS. 
2 See IP, 33. 
3 TS, 2. 
4 E. Husserl, Logical Investigations, vol. I, Routledge & Paul Kegan, London 1970, pp. 157-158. 
5 E. Husserl, The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology, Northwestern 
University Press, Evanston 1970, p. 123. 
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32 See E.S. Casey, The Fate of Place. A Philosophical History, University of California Press, 
1998, p.218. 
33 See E.S. Casey, The Fate of Place. A Philosophical History, cit., p.218. 
34 E.S.Casey, The Fate of Place. A Philosophical History, cit., p. 219. 
35 See, U. Claesges, Edmund Husserls Theorie der Raumkonstitution, cit., p.127. 
36 See L. Landgrebe, “Prinzipien einer Lehre vom Empfinden”, in Zeitschrift fuer philosophische 
Forschung, VIII, 1954, p.205. 
37 U. Claesges, Edmund Husserls Theorie der Raumkonstitution, cit., p.129. 
38 U. Claesges,  Edmund Husserls Theorie der Raumkonstitution, cit., p.122. 
39 E.S. Casey, The Fate of Place. A Philosophical History, cit., p.219. 
40 See Beilage 73, “Die Konstitution des Raumes in Synthetischen Uebergang von Nahraum zu 
Nahraum”, in E. Husserl, Zur Phaenomenologie des Intersubjectivitaet. Zweiter Teil: 1921-28, 
Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague 1973,  where Husserl writes, among other things, that “der Raum 
[ist] konstituiert im Uebergang von Nahraum zu Nahraum durch Fernkinaesthesen” (p.546). 
41 M. Heidegger, Being and Time, State University of New York Press, Albany 1953, p. 135. 
42 See M. Heidegger, On the Way to Language, Harper & Row, New York 1971, p. 93. 
43 E.S. Casey, The Fate of Place. A Philosophical History,  cit., p.220. 
44 E. Husserl, The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology, cit., p.217. 
 
Notes to chapter 3 
 
45 R. Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton University Press, Princeton 1979. 
46 R. Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, cit., p.170. 
47 W. A. deVries, Wilfrid Sellars, McGill-Queen’s University Press, Ithaca 2005,  p.62. 
48 R. Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, cit., p.64. Sellars points out that the question 
concerning the existence of synthetic a priori knowledge depends on a decision rather than on an 
answer: “What the decision should be, that is, which meaning (if any) should be attached to the 
term  ‘a priori’, it is by no means easy to say. Many factors are involved, by no means the least of 
which is a sense of belonging to one or other of the two major traditions of Western philosophy.… 
If one is tired of philosophical shibboleths, and finds important insights on both sides of the fence, 
one will content oneself with pointing out that while every conceptual frame involves propositions 
which, though synthetic, are true ex vi terminorum, every conceptual frame is also but one among 
many which compete for adoption in the market-place of experience” (ITSA, in SPR, 319-320).  
49 R. Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature , cit., p.174. 
50 According to Sellars, learning to use a language doesn’t amount to learning to obey the rules for 
the use of its expressions; obeying rules, as a matter of fact, involves using the language in which 
the rules are formulated leading in this way to a vicious regress. To avoid this, we ought to 
substitute “the phrase ‘learning to conform to the rules…’ for ‘learning to obey the rules…’ where 
‘conforming to a rule enjoining the doing of A in circumstances C’ is to be equated simply with 
‘doing A when the circumstances are C’- regardless of how one comes to do it” (SRLG, in SPR, 
322). In doing so, learning to use a language (L) doesn’t entail no longer having learned to use the 
metalanguage (ML), and so on. 
51 R. Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, cit., p.177. 
52 L. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, Blackwell, Oxford 2001, pp.27e-28e; hereafter PI. 
53 R. Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, cit., p.178. The claim that justification is a 
practice referred to what we already accept amounts to reject, in Sellars’ point of view, the falsely 
atomistic conception of belief: individual beliefs, as a matter of fact, are neither meaningful nor 
justified in isolation from the conceptual framework of which they are part. 
54 Sellars writes: “Jones thinks out-loud: Lo! Here is a red apple. Now to say that this visual 
thinking-out-loud that something is the case is epistemically justified or reasonable or has 
authority is clearly not to say that Jones has correctly inferred from certain premises, which he has 
good reason to believe, that there is a red apple in front of him. For we are dealing with a 
paradigm case of non inferential belief. The authority of the thinking accrues to it in quite a 
different way. It can be traced to the fact that Jones has learned to use the relevant words in 
perceptual situations” (SK, 324). 
55 Sellars points out: “One of the forms taken by the Myth of the Given is the idea that there is, 
indeed must be, a structure of particular matter of fact such that (a) each fact can not only be non-
inferentially known to be the case, but presupposes no other knowledge either of particular matter 
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of fact, or of general truth; and (b) such that the non-inferential knowledge of facts belonging to 
this structure constitutes the ultimate court of appeals for all factual claims- particular and general-
about the world. It is important to note that I characterized the knowledge of fact belonging to this 
stratum as not only non-inferential but as presupposing no knowledge of other matter of fact 
whether particular or general. It might be thought that this is a redundancy, that knowledge (not 
belief or conviction, but knowledge) which logically presupposes knowledge of other facts must  
be inferential. This, however, as I hope to show, is itself an episode in the myth” (EPM, 164).  
56R.  Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, cit., note 12, p.179. 
57 ENWW, 646. 
58 EPM, 170. 
59 See W. A. deVries, Wilfrid Sellars, cit., p.273; see also SM, 226. 
60 W. A. deVries,  Wilfrid Sellars, cit., p.273. 
61 CDCM, 285. 
62 G. Gutting, “Philosophy of Science”, in C.F. Delaney, M.J.Loux, Gary Gutting, W.D. Solomon 
(eds.), The Synoptic Vision. Essays on the Philosophy of Wilfrid Sellars, University of Notre Dame 
Press, Notre Dame 1977, p.88; see also IM, 322. 
63 EPM, 160. 
64 R. Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, cit., p. 184. 
65 R. Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, cit., p. 186. 
66 See J. McDowell, Mind and World, Harvard University Press, Cambridge 1996, p.46. 
67 J. McDowell,  Mind and World, cit., p.46. 
68 EPM, 127. 
69 See EPM, sec.62. 
70 EPM, 195. 
71 SK, 59. 
72 W. A. deVries, Wilfrid Sellars, cit., p.276. 
73 J. McDowell, Mind and World, cit., p. xiv. 
74 See SK, 295. 
75 SK, 2.     
76 EPM, 165. 
77EPM, 166.  
78 EPM, 167. 
79 EPM, 167-168. 
80 PSIM in SPR, 27. 
81 IAMB in PP, 385. 
82 Linguistic expressions, in Sellars’ point of view, can play three important roles which, in some 
way, determine also their meanings: 
1. Language-entry transitions thanks to which a speaker responds to objects (perceptible or 
introspectible), events or situations with linguistic activity; 
2. Intralinguistic moves which concern various transition rules of the language like e.g. valid 
inference rules; 
3. Language-exit transitions which transform linguistic episodes (e.g. ‘I shall now eat a 
cake’) in appropriate behaviors (in the case above, e.g., going to the kitchen, taking a 
cake and beginning to eat it). 
   For Sellars, as for Quine and Davidson, words have meaning only in the context of an entire 
language. See for this subject of matter LRB, 310;SRLG in SPR, 327-31; NAO, 67,69. 
83 IAMB in PP, 385-6. 
84 W. A. DeVries, Wilfrid Sellars, cit., p. 227. 
85 R. C. Richardson, G. Muhlenberg, “Sellars and Sense Impressions”, Erkenntnis, 17, 1982,  
pp.171-211.  
86 See SPR, ch.4. 
87R. C. Richardson, G. Muhlenberg, , “Sellars and Sense Impressions”, cit., p. 12.       
88 EPM, 170. It can be important to note that to dispose of foundation doesn’t amount to refuse the 
possibility of immediate knowledge; the two questions, as a matter of fact, must be distinguished: 
“Even if there is something radically wrong with the concept of an immediate experience of a 
particular or of a fact, there is still the claim that some beliefs are self-warranted, the claim that 
some beliefs are epistemized by reliable noninferential origin, and so on” (W. P. Alston, “What’s 
Wrong with Immediate Knowledge?”, Synthese, 55, 1983, p.74. 
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89 J. McDowell, Mind and World,  cit., pp.135-136. 
90 J. McDowell, Mind and World, cit., p.8. 
91 J. McDowell, Mind and World,  cit., p.32. 
92 J. McDowell, Mind and World,  cit., p. 34. 
93 Distinguishing between a legend that doesn’t imply neither the existence of an object nor its 
nonexistence, and a myth, which implies the nonexistence of an object, William S. Robinson tries 
to conclude that Sellars’ view on the Given doesn’t bring to argue that the Given is a myth; see 
W.S. Robinson, “The Legend of the Given” in H-N. Castañeda, (ed.),  Action, Knowledge, and 
Reality, cit., p.83. 
94 RNWWR, 46. 
95 RNWWR, 46. 
96Cfr. J. F. Rosenberg, Fusing the images, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2007, p.15.  
97 EPM, 172. 
98 NAO, 1-2. 
99 See EPM, 173. 
100 EPM, 173. 
101 R. C. Richardson, G. Muhlenberg, “Sellars and Sense Impressions”, cit., p.14. 
102 EPM, 172. 
 
Notes to chapter 4 
 
1 A preliminary version of this essay appeared with the title “Wittgenstein on colour-issues” in 
Dialegesthai. Rivista telematica di filosofia, 10, 2008 [on-line: 
http://mondodomani.org/dialegesthai/]. 
2 Wittgenstein as a matter of fact states: “ Tautology and contradiction are not pictures of the 
reality. They present no possible state of affairs. For the one allows every possible state of affairs, 
the other none.” (TLP, prop.4.462) 
3  See R. Ciuni, “The colour exclusion problem and ‘synthetic a priori’ propositions between 
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus and Some Remarks on Logical Form” in A. Coliva, E. Picardi, 
Wittgenstein today, Il Poligrafo, Padova 2004, pp.121-139. 
4 E. Husserl, Logical Investigations, vol.II,  Routledge,  London 2001, p.21. 
5  R. Ciuni, “The colour exclusion problem and ‘synthetic a priori’ propositions between Tractatus 
Logico-Philosophicus and Some Remarks on Logical Form”, cit., p.126. 
6 Proposition 4.221 of TLP states: “It is obvious that in the analysis of propositions we must come 
to elementary propositions, which consist of names in immediate combination”. 
7 E. Husserl, Logical Investigations, vol.II, cit., p.21. Husserl states fully and clearly that a 
synthetic proposition is a specification (Besonderung) of synthetic a priori laws; empirical 
specifications are, of course, propositions like “This red is different from this green”. 
8 E. Husserl, Logical Investigations, vol.II, cit., p.19. 
9 Cfr. F. Waismann, Ludwig Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle,  Blackwell, Oxford 1979; in part. 
see pp. 102-107. 
10  Cfr. F. Waismann, Ludwig Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle, cit., pp. 67-68. 
11 E.  Husserl, Logical Investigations, vol. II, cit., p.4. 
12  In TLP, prop. 2.0131,  Wittgenstein writes: “A speck in the visual field, though it need not be 
red, must have some colour: it is, so to speak, surrounded by colour-space.”  In prop. 2.0251, 
Wittgenstein clarifies also that “Space, time, and colour (being coloured) are forms of objects”.  
13 See L. Wittgenstein, Remarks on Colour, Blackwell, Oxford 1977, sec. 218; hereafter RC. 
14 Cfr. L. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Remarks, Blackwell, Oxford1975, sec.219; hereafter PR. 
15 PR, sec 1. 
16 See PR, sec. 219, 220. 
17 PR, sec.3. 
18 PR, sec.4. 
19 See PR, sec. 221. 
20 Byong-Chul Park, Phenomenological Aspects of Wittgenstein’s Philosophy, Kluwer, Dordrecht 
1998, p.140. 
21 L. Wittgenstein, The Blue and Brown Books: Preliminary Studies for the “Philosophical 
Investigations”, Blackwell, Oxford 1958, p.56. 
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22 L. Wittgenstein, The Big Typescript: TS 213, Blackwell, Oxford 2005, p.320e; hereafter BT.  
According to Merrill Hintikka and Jaakko Hintikka even the introduction of the notion of 
language-games does not yet provide a basis for rejecting phenomenological language. See M.B. 
Hintikka, J. Hintikka, Investigating Wittgenstein, Blackwell, Oxford 1986, p.242. 
23 For Jaakko Hintikka a typical use of the adjective “phenomenological” is found in 
thermodynamics where a phenomenological approach is contrasted to a statistical one. See J. 
Hintikka, “The Idea in Phenomenology”, in K. Lehrer and J.C. Marek (eds.),  Austrian 
Philosophy: Past and Present. Essays in Honour of Rudolph Haller, Kluwer, Dordrecht 1997. 
24 See for this matter of fact E. Husserl, Phaenomenologische Psychologie, Martinus Nijhoff , Den 
Haag 1962, pp.302-303. 
25  PR, sec. I. 
26 L. Waismann, Ludwig Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle, cit., p.45. 
27 PR, sec.11. 
28  See PR, sec. 68; Wittgenstein writes: “Isn’t it clear that this would be the most immediate 
description we can possibly imagine? That is to say, that anything which tried to be more 
immediate still would inevitably cease to be a description”. 
29 See the following passage in RC, II, sec. 16: “Phenomenological analysis (as e.g. Goethe would 
have it) is analysis of concepts and can neither with nor contradict physics”. For this reason 
Wittgenstein’s researches on colours don’t amount to a psychological investigation, so that all the 
assertions about them are not assumed as propositions of natural history. See also the following 
passages in RC, III, sec., 9-10: “If we say that the proposition ‘saturated yellow is lighter than 
saturated blue’ doesn’t belong to the realm of psychology ( for only so could it be natural history)- 
this means that we are not using it as a proposition of natural history. And the question then is : 
what is the other, non-temporal use like?”. “For this is the only way we can distinguish 
propositions of ‘the mathematics of colour’ from those of natural history”. 
30  BT, 323e. 
31  BT, 324e. 
32  N. F. Gier, Wittgenstein and Phenomenology: A Comparative Study of the Later Wittgenstein, 
Husserl, Heidegger, and Merleau-Ponty, State University of New York  Press , Albany 1981. 
33  P.M.S. Hacker, “The Rise and Fall of the Picture Theory”, in I. Block (ed.), Perspectives on the 
Philosophy of Wittgenstein, Blackwell, Oxford 1981, pp.86-87. 
34 A. Kenny, Wittgenstein, The Penguin Press, Harmondsworth 1973, p.114. 
35 L.  Wittgenstein, Remarks on Logical Form , in I.M. Copi,  R.W. Beard, (eds.), Essays on 
Wittgenstein's Tractatus, London 1966, p. 30; hereafter RLF. 
36 RLF, 32. 
37 RLF, 32. 
38 RLF, 35. 
39 M. Mcginn, “Wittgenstein on colour: from logic to grammar „ in A. Coliva, E. Picardi (eds.), 
Wittgenstein today, Il Poligrafo, Padova 2004, p. 114. 
40 L. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, Blackwell, Oxford 1953, sec.108; hereafter PI. 
41 TLP, prop. 5.5563. 
42 PI, sec. 124. 
43 PI, sec. 125. 
44 PI, sec. 126. 
45L. Wittgenstein, The Blue and Brown Books, cit., pp.17-20.  
46 RC, sec.1. 
47 RC, sec.I-63. 
48 RC, sec.  III-30. 
49 RC, sec. I-76. 
50 RC, sec. III-112. 
51 In RC, III-332, Wittgenstein writes: “Couldn’t seeing be the exception? [I.e. rather than 
blindness being the exception.] But neither the blind nor the sighted could describe it, except as an 
ability to do this or that. Including e.g. playing certain language-games; but we must be careful 
how we describe these games”. 
52 RC, III-71.  
53 RC, III-72. 
54 M.B. Hintikka, J. Hintikka, , Investigating Wittgenstein, cit.,  p.295. 
55 Ibidem. 
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56 PI, sec. 56. 
57 Wittgenstein writes: “[…] the language-game with colours is characterized by what we are able 
to do, and what we are not able to do” (Zettel, sec.345). Another passage contained in Remarks on 
Colours is considerable in order to understand Wittgenstein’s rejection of inner experiences: “If 
the psychologist teaches us, “There are people who see”, we can then ask him: “And what do you 
call ‘people who see’?” The answer to that would have to be: People who behave so-and-so under 
such-and-such circumstances” (RC, sec. I-88). 
58 PI, sec.280. 
59 M.B. Hintikka, J. Hintikka, Investigating Wittgenstein, cit., p.301. 
60 BT, 55e-56e. 
61 RC, sec. III- 19; see also RC, III- 43. 
 
